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The traditional American concept of criminal sentencing is that
prisons exist for rehabilitation and release as much as for incarceration.
1 However, in recent years Congress and state legislatures have
enacted a series of stringent anti-drug laws, which have largely abandoned
the concept of rehabilitating prisoners2 and instead, focused on
keeping inmates locked up for longer periods of time.’
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I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional American concept of criminal sentencing is that
prisons exist for rehabilitation and release as much as for incarcera-
tion.1 However, in recent years Congress and state legislatures have
enacted a series of stringent anti-drug laws, which have largely aban-
doned the concept of rehabilitating prisoners2 and instead, focused on
keeping inmates locked up for longer periods of time.'
1. Michael A. Kroll, The Prison Experiment: A Circular History, S. Exposure,
Winter 1978, at 6. See generally Kurt Anderson, What Are Prisons For?, TIME, Sept.
13, 1982, at 38.
2. Michael Isikoff and Tracy Thompson, Getting Too Tough on Drugs; Draco-
nian Sentences Hurt Small Offenders More Than Kingpins, THE WASHINGTON POST,
November 4, 1990, at Cl.
3. Brief for Respondent at 2, Harmelin v. Michigan, Ill S. Ct. 2680 (1991)
(No. 89-7272) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. Since the complete revision of the
federal sentencing system in 1984, sentences are no longer rehabilitative in nature and
1
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Legislatures are reacting to an ever-increasing spiral of drug traf-
fic, drug abuse and drug-related crime4 by instituting these harsh pen-
alties in an attempt to thwart drug activity. 5 The result of this "war-
on-drugs legislation" is an overwhelmed court system and staggering
increases in the nation's prison population.6 Since 1986, average jail
time served in federal drug cases is fifty-eight months, an increase of
151 percent.7
One weapon used in this war-on-drugs is the mandatory life sen-
tence without opportunity of parole, commonly called "life without pa-
role".8 A mandatory life sentence without parole is the "penultimate
penalty", meaning a convict will spend the rest of his natural life be-
hind bars.9 The recent development and current prevalence of life with-
out parole is due to the fact that it addresses legislative policies under-
lying criminal penalties.' 0 Legislators mandate these life sentences
without parole hoping the penalty will not only prevent the offender
from injuring others, but also act as a societal deterrent."
Unfortunately these "life without parole sentences" without parole
do not produce the desired results and often lead to injustice. Perhaps
the most persuasive argument against mandatory life sentences is one
of fairness.' 2 While many Americans were unhappy with lenient
parole has been eliminated in favor of determinate sentences. Id.
4. Ruth Marcus, Life in Prison For Cocaine Possession?; High Court Weighing
Strict Michigan Law, THE WASHINGTON POST, November 5, 1990, at Al. Fifty seven
percent of a national sample of males arrested in 1989 for homicide tested positive for
illegal drugs. National Institute of Justice, 1989 Drug Use Forecasting Annual Report
June, 1990. The comparable statistics for assault, robbery and weapons arrests were
55, 73, and 63 percent, respectively. Id. In Michigan, in 1988, 68 percent of a sample
of male arrestees and 81 percent of a sample of female arrestees tested positive for
illegal drugs. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2706 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
5. Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 7.
6. Isikoff and Thompson, supra note 2, at Cl.
7. Dennis Cauchon, The Scales of Justice May be Tipped Unfairly, USA To-
DAY, June 24, 1991, at A8.
8. Wright, Life-Without-Parole: An Alternative To Death Or Not Much Of A
Life At All?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1990).
9. Id.
10. See People v. Lemble, 303 N.W.2d 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
11. Id.
12. Concerned that mandatory minimum sentences, which already affect about
one-third of federal sentences are unfair, judges in several federal circuits have joined
in formal protests against this type of sentencing. See Sturgess, Mandatory Sentences
Draw Increased Fire; Judges, Families Join Fight Against Minimum Guidelines, THE
1502 [Vol. 16
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judges, mandatory life imprisonment was viewed as the panacea of
anti-drug legislation. No longer would the judge's discretion be the sole
determinate of a criminal's punishment. Rather each drug offender
would receive a harsh, but equal treatment. On the contrary,
mandatory life sentences have failed to treat all criminals the same.13
One reason for this inequity is due to the prosecutors' authority to dic-
tate a criminal's penalty by their choice of charges filed. 1 ' In Harme-
lin's case, for instance, had prosecutors filed charges against him in
federal court, rather than in state court, he would be facing a much
more lenient sentence.
Another inequity in this anti-drug legislation is the frequency by
which large-scale drug traffickers evade these mandatory sentences. It
is ironic that drug kingpins, the targets of these anti-drug laws, have
been given lesser sentences for providing law enforcement with infor-
mation regarding their drug ring." In 1988, the House Judiciary Sub-
committee on Crime learned of a drug kingpin who was released from
custody for providing law enforcement with the names of twelve lower-
level dealers.1 6 All twelve lower-level dealers received mandatory
sentences. 7
In a recent decision, Harmelin v. Michigan,8 the Supreme Court
considered the scope of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishments against the imposition of a mandatory life
sentence without parole for a nonviolent first offense of possession of
672 grams of cocaine. 9 The Court held that "mandatory [life] penal-
ties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional
sense."'20 Accordingly, this decision sharply limits the holding in Solem
v. Helm,2 a 1983 Supreme Court case which incorporated the notion
that criminal sentences should be proportional to the crime.22
RECORDER, May 7, 1991 at 1.
13. W. John Moore, Mindless Minimums, NATIONAL JOURNAL, June I, 1991 at
1310.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2701.
21. 463 U.S. 277 (1983)( holding the defendant's sentence was significantly dis-
proportionate to the crime, and therefore was prohibited by the Eight Amendment).
22. Marcus, supra note 4, at Al.
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Traditionally, the Eighth Amendment"3 has regulated the mode of
punishment, as well as the length of a sentence.2" This Comment ex-
plores whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and un-
usual punishments limits the authority of legislatures to prescribe these
mandatory life sentences without the possibility for parole. The answer
to this issue has both social and legal impacts.25 As a matter of social
policy, this issue poses questions about the purpose of our prison sys-
tem, the role, if any, of rehabilitation and the degree to which individ-
ual moral culpability and mitigating circumstances should be taken
into account during sentencing. 6 As a question of law, this issue sheds
light on the scope of cruel and unusual punishments under the eighth
amendment and the meaning of the proportionality principle as defined
in Solem.17
This Comment's central thesis is that Harmelin was wrongly de-
cided for three reasons: 1) prior Supreme Court precedent firmly estab-
lishes that the power of legislatures to set criminal sentences is subject
to an Eighth Amendment proportionality review;2 8 2) mandatory life
sentences without parole should be subject to the individualized sen-
tencing prevalent in capital cases,29 and 3) Harmelin's sentence of life
in prison without parole was disproportionate to the crime."
This Comment will be divided into five sections. Following this in-
troduction, section II provides an historical analysis of eighth amend-
ment jurisprudence. Specifically, this section interprets the eighth
amendment as incorporating a principle of proportionality of punish-
ments. It then examines the evolution of the individualized sentencing
doctrine adopted in capital cases. Next, section III reviews the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Harmelin v. Michigan.31 Section IV
addresses the flaws in the Michigan statute under which Harmelin re-
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
24. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284.
25. Marcus, supra, note 4, at Al.
26. Id.
27. Id.; Solem, 463 U.S. at 277.
28. E.g., id.
29. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty does not
violate Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment); Woodson v. North
California, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
30. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2719 (White, J., dissenting).
31. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
1504 [Vol. 16
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ceived life in prison without parole, and applies the Solem proportional-
ity factors 2 to the facts in Harmelin to demonstrate how the case was
wrongly decided. Finally, Section V concludes by stressing the detri-
mental effects caused by the recent trend of mandatory minimum
sentences in anti-drug legislation illustrated by the Michigan statute3
which was upheld in Harmelin.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Legislatures have the power to define crimes and to establish pun-
ishment.3 4 However, no penalty is per se constitutional.35 Legislative
power is subject to judicial review to ensure that the punishment passes
constitutional muster.3 The judicial role of enforcing the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment "'cannot be evaded
by invoking the obvious truth that the legislature has the power to pre-
scribe punishments for crimes. That is precisely the reason the clause
appears in the Bill of Rights.' "31 Consequently, in order to pass consti-
tutional muster a punishment must fall within the scope of proportion-
ality which has evolved along with the Eighth Amendment. 8
A. The Scope of Proportionality Under the Eighth Amendment
The principle that a punishment must be proportionate to the
crime has deep roots that stem back as far as the Magna Carta, which
established the right against excessive "amercements" or fines.3 9 Chap-
ter twenty of the Magna Carta provided that "a free man shall not be
amerced for a trivial offense, except in accordance with the degree of
the offense."'
The principle of proportionality also appeared in the English Bill
32. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-93 (1983).
33. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.7403 (West 1980).
34. Brief in Support of Petitioner at 12, Harmelin v. Michigan, I II S. Ct. 2680
(1991) (No. 89-7272) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
35. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (noting that a single
day in prison may be unconstitutional).
36. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290.
37. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 12 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 268 (1972) (Brennan, J. concurring)).
38. See, e.g., Solem, 463 U.S. at 277; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962); United States v. Weems, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
39. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284 n.18.
40. A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA TEXT AND COMMENTARY 40 (1964).
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of Rights of 1689 as "a longstanding principle of English law that the
punishment . . . should not be, by reason of its excessive length or se-
verity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged".4 The framers
of the Eighth Amendment repeated nearly verbatim the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause referenced in the English Bill of Rights of
1689.42 Thus, as a result, some historians conclude that American colo-
nists sought protection of the same liberties enjoyed by English citi-
zens.'" The Eighth Amendment ensures that: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted."" Despite the fact that the reference to "cruel and un-
usual" punishment is less specific than the reference to "excessive bail"
and "excessive fines", the Supreme Court has concluded that the
amendment was designed to impose "parallel limitations" on bails,
fines and other punishments.45
The concept of proportionality is well entrenched in this country's
eighth amendment jurisprudence.' 6 In United States v. Weems,"7 the
Supreme Court first articulated the notion that proportionality was "a
precept of justice that [the] punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to [the] offense."' 8 Applying this principle, the Court
held that a fifteen year sentence of hard labor in chains was a dispro-
41. RICHARD L. PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 236 (Am Bar Found.,1959).
Another historian who believes English law includes disproportionality is Granucci. See
Anthony F. Granucci, 'Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted'.- The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
42. Solem, 463 U.S. at 285 n.10.
43. See Perry, supra note 41, at 234-38. Following independence, a number of
state constitutions adopted the notion that the punishment must fit the crime. See, e.g.,
PA. CONST. at § 38 (1776) (calling for a review of its penal system to make "punish-
ments in some cases less sanguinary and in general more proportionate to the crime");
S.C. CONST. at § XL (1776) (supporting a reformation to make punishments "more
proportionate to the crime"); see Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties
Union and the ACLU of Michigan in Support of Petitioner at 12, Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (No. 89-7272) [hereinafter ACLU Brief for Petitioner].
44. US. CONST. amend. VIII.
45. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). The Supreme Court has
noted that it would be illogical if the lesser punishment of a fine and the greater pun-
ishment of death were both subject to proportionality analysis, while the intermediate
punishment of imprisonment was not. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983).
46. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11, Harmelin v. Michigan,
Ill S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (No. 89-7272) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae for Peti-
tioner] (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983)).
47. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
48. Id. at 367 n.14.
1506 [Vol. 16
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portionate penalty for falsifying public documents. 9 Part of the Court's
concern was unquestionably based on the mode of punishment, which
bordered on the torturous"0 as well as the length of the punishment. 51
The Court in Weems maintained that even though it had not deter-
mined the exact scope of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual
punishments clause; the Eighth Amendment did include the require-
ment that the penalty be proportionate to the crime."
More than fifty years later, the Court reached a similar conclusion
in Robinson v. California.5" The defendant in Robinson was a drug
addict who was convicted under a California statute which classified
drug addiction as a misdemeanor.54 The Court stated that "imprison-
ment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is
either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the
abstract. Even one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punish-
ment for the crime of having a common cold."155 The Court reasoned
that allowing a sickness to be made a crime and permitting sick people
to be punished for being sick would be a violation of the eighth amend-
ment."' Accordingly, the Robinson Court further incorporated the prin-
ciple of proportionality into Eighth Amendment jurisprudence."
Following Robinson, the question of proportionality arose in a se-
ries of Eighth Amendment challenges involving capital punishment.5 8
In Coker v. Georgia,59 a plurality of the Court held that the death
penalty was an excessive punishment for the crime of rape."0 Similarly,
in Enmund v. Florida,"1 the Court held that felony murder does not
49. Id. at 367.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81.
53. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
54. Id. at 660 n.1.
55. Id. at 667.
56. Id. at 666.
57. Additionally, Robinson established the application of the Eighth Amend-
ment's cruel and unusual punishment clause to the states. Id. at 675.
58. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (capital punishment im-
posed for the crime of murder cannot be viewed as invariably disproportionate to the
severity of that crime); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (the penalty of death
imposed on three defendants, one for murder, and two for rape, violated the eighth
amendments' prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
59. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
60. Id. at 592 n.4.
61. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
19921 1507
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trigger the death penalty unless the state provesbeyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intended the murder in addition to the under-
lying felony.62
In the past eighty years, the one significant exception to propor-
tionality in sentencing was Rummel v. Estelle.6 The Rummel Court
rejected the eighth amendment challenge of a Texas recidivist sen-
tenced to life imprisonment for his third felony conviction." The Court,
however, did not entirely reject the proportionality principle.15 To the
contrary, the Rummel majority averred that "a proportionality princi-
ple would . . . come into play . . . if a legislature made overtime park-
ing a felony punishable by life imprisonment." 6
Undoubtedly, the hypothetical chosen by the Rummel majority
was intended as an "extreme example".67 Nevertheless, since the Court
maintained that some prison sentences could be constitutionally exces-
sive, it would be illogical to conclude that "the length of the sentence
actually imposed [is] purely a matter of legislative prerogative." '68 The
critical question, then, is what criteria to use in determining when leg-
islators have exceeded their constitutional limits in mandating prison
sentencing guidelines. Unfortunately, Rummel offers no such criteria or
assistance in the determination of this matter.
Three years later in Solem v. Helm, the Supreme Court enumer-
ated objective factors to be considered in reviewing the proportionality
of sentences.69 In Solem, the defendant was convicted of attempting to
cash a "no account" check, his seventh conviction of a non-violent fel-
ony. Under South Dakota law he was treated as a recidivist and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment without parole.70
62. Id. at 799. Between the decisions in Robinson and Enmund a number of
Supreme Court decisions referred to'the fact that disproportionate punishment violates
the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (per
curiam); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
664, 667 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell and Stevens, JJ.).
63. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 274, n.ll.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274.
69. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
70. Id. at 281-83. The South Dakota recidivist statute provided that when a de-
fendant had been convicted of at least three prior convictions in addition to the princi-
pal felony, then the sentence for the principal felony should be enhanced to a maximum
1508 [Vol. 16
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The Solem Court distinguished Rummel by reasoning that a sen-
tence under the South Dakota statute was significantly different than
the sentence upheld in Rummel since it precluded all possibility of pa-
role. 71 The Court invoked a comparative test employing objective crite-
ria in determining that the sentence of life without parole was not com-
mensurate with Helm's crimes.1  The Court's objective criteria
included consideration of the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty, the sentence imposed by the same jurisdiction for other
crimes, and the sentence imposed by other jurisdictions for the same
offense. 73 Because the crimes were nonviolent, and the Court found the
punishment to be substantially more severe than would be imposed in
nearly all other jurisdictions, it declared the sentence in violation of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 74
The Court in Solem specified that its holding should not mandate
appellate review of all prison sentences since courts were obligated to
grant substantial deference to legislative judgment and trial court deci-
sions when assessing proportionality. 7 However, such deference should
not eliminate judicial scrutiny of those cases where a sentence may be
so disproportionate as to raise a valid Eighth Amendment claim.78 Fur-
thermore, such scrutiny should incorporate the objective factors out-
lined by the Court to determine whether a punishment is excessive in
relation to the crime." Through the use of these objective factors the
Court further entrenched the principle of proportionality in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence since this proportionality principle acts as a
constitutional limit on the mode and length of criminal sentences. 78
Thus, the criminal penalties assessed by state legislatures cannot be
excessive or arbitrarily imposed, but rather, the punishment must com-
port with this proportionality principle.7
penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. at 281.
71. Id. at 302-03.
72. Id. at 291-92.
73. Id. at 290-92.
74. Solem, 463 U.S. at 300.
75. Id. at 290 n.16.
76. Id. at 290.
77. Id. at 291 n.17.
78. Id. at 284.
79. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284.
19921 1509
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B. The Evolution of Individualized Sentencing
Throughout the Supreme Court's holdings in a series of capital
cases the Court has established a constitutional doctrine requiring indi-
vidualized sentencing. 0 This doctrine requires the sentencer to consider
relevant mitigating circumstances of the offense and the offender before
sentencing a defendant to the death penalty.8 Although individual
sentences have been exclusively applied to capital cases, the reasoning
for adopting such a doctrine is applicable to mandatory life sentences
without opportunity for parole.82 Since a defendant could spend the rest
of his life in prison without any opportunity for reconsideration, the
sentencing authority should be able to consider relevant mitigation cir-
cumstances. 83 Thus, an overview of some of the important Supreme
Court cases highlights the philosophy that offenders who commit the
same crime should not always receive the same punishment, without
the consideration of relevant mitigating evidence.
Society distinguishes between those who are culpable while com-
mitting a crime and those who are not. 4 In Lockett v. Ohio, the de-
fendant faced the death penalty for helping to plan an armed robbery
and waiting outside in the car when a store owner was killed.8 5 The
Supreme Court reversed the death sentence imposed by the Ohio Su-
preme Court and held that the concept of individualized sentences in
criminal cases has long been accepted in America. 6 The Court con-
cluded that in order to pass constitutional muster a death penalty stat-
ute must not preclude the consideration of relevant mitigating factors.8 7
Therefore, since the Ohio statute did not take into consideration
whether the offender intended to cause the death of the victim it was
80. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
81. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (defendant is entitled to jury in-
struction which may include mitigating evidence such as mental retardation which the
jury may consider when determining whether to impose the death penalty); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597-609 (1978) (plurality opinion) (considering defendant's char-
acteristics, his record and circumstances of the offense).
82. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 42-43.
83. Id.
84. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 626.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 605 n.13. The Lockett opinion expressly left open the application of
individualized sentencing to mandatory minimum sentences in noncapital cases. Id.
87. Id.
1510 [Vol. 16
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incompatible with the Eighth Amendment.88
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, the defendant faced
capital punishment for first-degree murder. 9 The Supreme Court de-
clared the North Carolina statute90 unconstitutional since it failed to
provide for the consideration of relevant aspects of the character and
record of the defendant.91 In support of its holding the Court quoted
Justice Black's statement made over twenty-seven years earlier that
" '[t]he belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal cate-
gory calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life
and habits of a particular offender.' "92
More than ten years later, in Sumner v. Shuman,93 the Supreme
Court faced the question of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits a
statute which sentences an inmate who commits murder while already
serving a sentence of life imprisonment without parole to the death
penalty.9 ' The Court held that, even given these aggravating circum-
stances, the Eighth Amendment did not allow a departure from the
requirement of individualized sentencing.9" Consequently, this sentenc-
ing doctrine requires that the sentencing authority consider, as a miti-
gating factor, any aspect of the defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense.9"
III. HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN: AN OVERVIEW
A. Facts and Procedural History
The issue of whether a mandatory sentence of life imprisohmeInt
without parole violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruIel
and unusual punishment was recently decided by the Supreme Court in
Harmelin v. Michigan.9 In Harmelin, the defendant, a forty-two year
old man with no prior criminal record was pulled over for failing to
88. Id. at 608.
89. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975) (imposing a mandatory death sen-
tence for first degree murder).
91. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
92. Id. at 296-97 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
93. 482 U.S. 66 (1987).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 73-76.
96. Id. at 70-76.
97. III S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
1992] 1511
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stop at a red light.9 8 Harmelin voluntarily revealed to the police officer
that he was carrying a gun and produced a permit to carry a concealed
weapon. Nevertheless, the police subsequently searched his person and
impounded his vehicle. 99 The search of his person revealed marijuana
cigarettes, assorted pills, ten small packets of cocaine, 100 three vials of
cocaine and a telephone pager. The search of the impounded vehicle
revealed a travel bag containing $2900 in cash, 672.5 grams of co-
caine'0 1 and a coded address book. Harmelin was charged and con-
victed of possession of 650 or more grams of cocaine,10 2 and possession
of a firearm during the commission of a felony. a03 He was sentenced by
the Oakland County Circuit Court to a mandatory life term of impris-
onment without possibly of parole.'04
On appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, Harmelin argued
that his mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amend-
ment.' 05 Additionally, he claimed the sentence was unconstitutional
since the sentencing judge was required to impose it regardless of the
particular circumstances of his case.' 6 The Michigan Court of Appeals
eventually affirmed his conviction' 017 and the Michigan Supreme Court
98. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 77-78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
99. Id.
100. Id. One such packet was analyzed and found to contain 0.14 grams of a
mixture containing cocaine. Id.
101. Approximately one and one-half pounds.
102. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 75-76; see MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
333.7403(l)(i) (West 1980).
103. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 77; see MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.227(b)
(West 1991).
104. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 77; see also MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
333.7403(2)(a)(i) (West 1980)(provides a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for
possession of 650 grams or more of "any mixture containing [a schedule 2] controlled
substance"); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.7214(a)(iv) (West 1980)(defines cocaine
as a schedule 2 controlled substance); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 791.234(4) (West
1982) (allows for eligibility of parole after ten years in prison, except for convictions of
first-degree murder or "a major controlled substance offense"); MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 791.233b[1](b) (West 1982) (defines "major controlled substance offense" as a
violation of section 333.7403). See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3-4, Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991)
(No. 89-7272).
105. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 5-6.
106. Id.
107. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 75. Harmelin also argued on appeal that his con-
viction must be reversed since the evidence against him was obtained as a result of an
12
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denied leave to appeal.1"8 Harmelin subsequently filed a petition for
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court which was
granted."°9
B. The Supreme Court's Holding and Rationale
In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court upheld Harmelin's sen-
tence holding that this case did not deserve the individualized sentenc-
ing usually reserved for capital cases."' The Harmelin decision sug-
gests that a mandatory life sentence without parole might be
unconstitutional for some crimes, but the Court was split on where it
would draw the line beyond where a sentence would violate the Eighth
Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment."' The Harmelin deci-
sion sharply limits the holding in Solem, which only eight years earlier,
had established that the Eighth Amendment required an element of
proportionality in criminal sentencing." 2 Justice Scalia, in the only
portion of his lead opinion adopted by the majority, stated that only in
capital punishment cases has the Court interpreted the Eighth Amend-
ment to require individualized sentencing." 3 The Court held that be-
cause of the qualitative differences between death and all other punish-
ments, consideration of the defendant's circumstances and the
appropriateness of the penalty should not be extended outside the capi-
tal context." '
The majority, in affirming the Michigan Court of Appeals deci-
sion, conducted an in-depth analysis of the Eighth Amendment's his-
tory and cases interpreting the cruel and unusual punishments
unconstitutional search and that he had been deprived effective assistance of counsel.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 4. The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed and
reversed his conviction, stating that the evidence against him was obtained from an
unconstitutional search. Id. However, in an order dated March 9, 1989, the Michigan
Court of Appeals vacated that judgment. Id. In an opinion (on reconsideration) dated
April 18, 1989, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Harmelin's conviction. Id. at
6.
108. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 6.
109. Harmelin v. Michigan, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
110. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
111. Id.
112. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1973).
113. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702; see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
114. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702.
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clause."' The majority concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not
provide for judicial inquiry to determine if a noncapital sentence is pro-
portionate to the offense. 11 Rather, the Eighth Amendment was pri-
marily intended as a check on legislators' ability to authorize particular
methods of punishment. 1 7 Furthermore, the majority argued that the
length of the sentence, however, is purely a matter of legislative prerog-
ative."' 8 Moreover, the majority averred that the proportionality princi-
ple is merely an invitation for judges to impose their own subjective
values 9 Contrary to Solem, the majority rejected the use of objective
criteria to determine whether a penalty is disproportionate and stated
that Solem, which decreed a "general principle of proportionality", 20
should be overruled.12 '
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, along with Justices
O'Connor and Souter, agreed that individualized sentencing should not
be extended to noncapital cases.122 However, Kennedy insisted on the
continued adherence to the narrow proportionality principle, which as-
sures that the punishment fit the crime, identified in Solem. 1 3 The con-
currence looked to the first prong of the Solem proportionality criteria,
the gravity of the offense and the severity of the punishment, and deter-
mined that Harmelin's crime was severe enough to justify the penalty
of life imprisonment without parole.12 Kennedy concluded that in light
of the severity of Harmelin's crime, his sentence was "within the con-
stitutional boundaries established by our prior decisions. '1125 Kennedy
asserted that the Solem analysis of proportionality need not be further
pursued since the Constitution only forbids sentences that are grossly
disproportionate to the crime. 26 Consequently, the two other criteria
115. Id. at 2684-96; see, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982), Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
116. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2684-96.
117: Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2687.
120. Solem, 463 U.S. at 288.
121. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2696-99.
122. Id. at 2703 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 2707.
124. Id. at 2705, 2706.
125. Id. at 2706; see Solem, 463 U.S. at 277; Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 263
(1980), Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 263 (1980), Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678,
685 (1978) (dicta).
126. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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listed in Solem; the comparison of the punishment to the punishments
for other crimes within the same jurisdiction, and the comparison of
other jurisdiction's punishment of the same crime, "are appropriate
only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime
committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality." 127
The dissenting Justices, White, Blackmun, Stevens and Mar-
shall, 123 argued that this approach was nearly as bad as overruling So-
lem.1 9 "While Justice Scalia seeks to deliver a swift death sentence to
Solem, Justice Kennedy prefers to eviscerate it, leaving only an empty
shell. 1 30 The dissent concluded that a comparative analysis, like the
one used in Solem, is the only way to determine if a sentence is dispro-
portionate to the offense.131 Applying the Solem criteria to the present
case, the dissent attacked Harmelin's sentence as too harsh: "Mere pos-
session of drugs - even in such a large quantity - is not so serious an
offense that it will always warrant, much less mandate, life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole." '32
IV. HARMELIN'S MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT
PAROLE: AN ANALYSIS
A. Lack of Individualized Sentencing and Other Flaws in the
Michigan Statute
Because of the unique nature of the death penalty, the Supreme
Court has applied individualized sentences to capital cases. 133 However,
like the death penalty, mandatory life imprisonment without parole
"treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely
individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated
mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty . , 134
An analysis of prison sentences frequently involves a comparison
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2719 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall filed a separate dis-
senting opinion arguing that capital punishment is always unconstitutional. Id.
129. Id. at 2714 (White, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2716.
133. E.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
134. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
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of factors which because of complex parole and sentence reduction pro-
visions do not lend themselves to an exact quantitative review."3 5 How-
ever, many sentencing alternatives such as the possibility of parole,
which normally interfere with the application of the Eighth Amend-
ment's cruel and unusual punishment clause to routine prison sentences
do not exist in Harmelin.13 6 In fact, a number of the factors used by
the Supreme Court to distinguish between capital and noncapital cases
-including the availability of probation, parole, and work furloughs- are
not available under the Michigan statute by which Harmelin was con-
victed.137 Consequently, the individualized sentencing doctrine should
be applied not only to capital cases, but also to mandatory life
sentences without the opportunity for parole like the one imposed in
Harmelin.138
The Michigan legislature, in an effort to curtail a steady increase
in drug related crime and drug abuse in Michigan, passed a bill in
1980 increasing the penalties for possession of certain controlled sub-
stances. 139 This Michigan statute under which Harmelin was convicted
mandates life imprisonment without parole to everyone convicted of
possessing any mixture of 650 grams or more containing cocaine. 14 0
Life imprisonment is imposed regardless of the circumstances of the
offense.1 41 This inflexible statute neither distinguishes between varying
levels of individual culpability nor does it consider a defendant's prior
criminal record. 42 Consequently, a drug kingpin with an extensive
criminal record is treated exactly the same as a minor participant who
is a first time offender.143 Additionally, the Michigan statute draws no
135. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 8, (citing Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)).
136. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 24.
137. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
333.7403(1)(i) (West 1980).
138. Brief of Amicus Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 42-43; see also
United States v. Perez, 685 F. Supp. 990, 1002 (W.D. Tex. 1988). In Perez, the court
stated: "[T]hat the defendant's ability to inform the Court of circumstances and fac-
tors should not be determined by whether the defendant faces a maximum punishment
of death, a life sentence, or a lesser term of incarceration." Id. at 1002.
139. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7403 (WEST 1980).
140. Id.
141. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 52.
142. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 5.
143. See People v. Harman, 333 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)(Kelly, J.,
dissenting).
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distinction based on the purity of the mixture. " " Thus, a person con-
victed of possessing one gram of cocaine mixed with 649 grams of
sugar would be subjected to mandatory life without parole.1 45
There. is no dispute that many drug dealers and users commit vio-
lent crimes.' 46 Additionally, many drug users die from overdoses or
give birth to drug addicted babies.147 Indeed, all drug dealers share the
responsibility for these atrocities, and should be punished accord-
ingly. 4 But to treat as killers every drug dealer and his "mules of
transport" is nothing more than mass hysteria."19 Such reasoning op-
poses legal principles and a series of Supreme Court Cases restricting
the death penalty to those who kill intentionally or by deliberately cre-
ating a grave risk to human life.1
5 0
Drug dealers do not deserve to be punished as severely as murder-
ers, unless they commit violent crimes.' 5 ' "Intentionally killing is
worlds apart, in terms of certainty of harm and moral culpability, from
acting as one of many suppliers selling drugs in a mass marketplace of
buyers, most of whom use drugs with knowledge of the risks."' 52 Fur-
thermore, such harsh penalties for drug activity do not accomplish their
goal of ridding the streets of dealers and deterring others from drug
involvement. 53
The Michigan legislature's attempt to deter drug trafficking by
targeting the higher echelon drug dealers has been criticized as unsuc-
cessful.3 4 In fact, the people actually being sentenced to life imprison-
ment are the "mules of transport".'55 While the real drug kingpins are
often given lesser sentences in the federal system for divulging key in-
formation to the government, the couriers, who conceivably lack access
to valuable information and are unable to offer information end up
144. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 9.
145. See Michigan v. Lemble, 303 N.W.2d 191 (Mich. 1981).
146. Stuart Taylor Jr., Don't Throw Away That Key, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 22,
1990, at 25.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts(Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1976).
151. Taylor, supra note 146, at 25.
152. Id.
153. Id. Every year thousands of youths are drawn to the drug trade despite the
dangers of being killed by competitors or punished by harsh criminal sanctions. Id.
154. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 10.
155. Marcus, supra note 4, at Al.
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serving mandatory life imprisonment without parole. The Michigan
Oakland County Circuit Court, summed up these problems with the
Michigan statute: 156
Having carefully considered this statute, I have come to the conclu-
sion that this law is the product of emotion, not reason. Politicians,
known as legislators, in an effort to respond to community pressure
and frustration over a very serious drug problem, rushed to a sim-
ple formula, in search of a solution - essentially throwing away the
key for life for any and all individuals who shall possess more than
650 grams of cocaine. However mindlessly throwing away the key
will neither deter such crime, nor promote justice. Quite the oppo-
site, bad laws, such as the one at issue here, promote disrespect
Every thinking person must know that there are many second de-
gree murderers, rapists, kidnappers, and other violent offenders
more dangerous to the public welfare than many people who pos-
sess over 650 grams of cocaine, Yet the law does not mandate a
natural life sentence for each and every such violent criminal. Why
then should it do so for the drug possessor? This is not to say that
select drug possessors or dealers should not be sent away for natu-
ral life; it is simply to say that it makes no sense to mandate such a
sentence for this offense and not to do so for many more dangerous
offenders. This law has done nothing to ameliorate the bad condi-
tions that exist in the State of Michigan with respect to the posses-
sion and distribution of illegal drugs. 57
Unlike the rapists, murderers, kidnappers and other violent crimi-
nal offenders referenced to by the Oakland County Circuit Court, the
Michigan statute requires that upon conviction, sentencing judges and
parole authorities are not to consider mitigating circumstances. 1 8
However, deference to legislative power does not preclude unreasonable
sentences from constitutional scrutiny.'6 9 In fact, the Supreme Court
has dictated that the level of judicial scrutiny must intensify as the
156. Because of the problems with the Michigan statute, Judge Lippitt of the
Oakland County Circuit Court disqualified himself from adjudicating, People v. Mar-
tin, No. 86-74706, slip op. (Oakland Co. Cir. August 20, 1987), a case similar to
Harmelin. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 11.
157. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34 at 11-12 (quoting Martin, No. 86-74706,
slip op. at 3, 4).
158. Id.
159. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 10.
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penalty increases and as the discretionary range of sentences nar-
rows.16 0 Consequently, an eighth amendment challenge for the penalty
of life in prison without parole should focus on whether the mandatory
life sentence is proportionate to the crime for which the defendant was
convicted.161
B. Under the Solem Analysis Harmelin's Sentence is
Disproportionate
Contrary to the majority's assertion, the So/em analysis has
proved eminently workable."' The probability that Solem would "flood
the appellate courts with cases in which . . . arbitrary lines must be
drawn" has not resulted.' In the eight years since the decision, only a
handful of sentences have been declared unconstitutional under the So-
lem standard. 164 In fact many courts have proven that they are "capa-
ble of applying the Eighth Amendment to disproportionate noncapital
sentences with a high degree of sensitivity to principles of federalism
and state autonomy."' 6 5 When properly applied, So/em is consistent
with these principles since it affords deference to legislatures' authority
to set punishments for crimes, as well as to judges when sentencing
convicted criminals.'66
The Solem Court listed three workable factors for the courts to
consider when evaluating the constitutionality of a criminal sentence.16 7
160. Id; see, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
161. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 12.
162. Harmelin v. Michigan, Ill S. Ct. 2680, 2696-97, 2712 (1991) (White, J.,
dissenting).
163. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 315 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
164. Harmelin, Ill S. Ct. at 2713 n.2. There have been only four cases cited
since Solem in which sentences have been reversed on the basis of a proportionality
review. See Ashley v. State, 538 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1989) (reaching a similar holding
for a defendant who burglarized a home to get four dollars to repay a grocer for food
eaten in the store); Clowers v. State, 522 So. 2d 762 (Miss. 1988) (trial court had
discretion to reduce a fifteen year sentence without parole for a defendant who uttered
a forged check); State v. Gilham, 549 N.E.2d 555 (Ohio 1988). Additionally, in
Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989), the court looked to both state and
federal constitutions before striking a life sentence without parole imposed on an ado-
lescent who killed and then robbed a person who had repeatedly molested him.
165. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 306 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); see
also Thiess v. State Board, 387 F. Supp. 1038, 1042 (Md. 1974).
166. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290.
167. Id. at 290-94.
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First, the court should weigh the gravity of the offense and the harsh-
ness of the penalty. 168 Second, the court should compare the sentences
imposed in the state for other crimes.169 Third, the court should com-
pare how other states treat the same offense.170
Through the incorporation of these objective factors Solem invokes
an Eighth Amendment review of sentencing that reflects constitutional
values and that works well in practice since it gives courts a standard
against which to measure punishments. 17 1 Therefore, there is no need
to reexamine these factors or overrule Solem.172 Undoubtedly, Harme-
lin was one of the situations in which the Solem standards needed to be
applied because the punishment of life imprisonment without parole
was too severe given the crime committed and the defendant's lack of a
previous record. 7
Application of the Solem factors to the sentence in Harmelin
reveals that the punishment is unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment.7 4 The first of the Solem factors requires a court to re-
view the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.1 75 In
an evaluation of the gravity of the offense, a court should consider "the
harm caused or threatened to the victim or society," based on such
things as the degree of violence involved in the crime as well as "the
absolute magnitude of the crime," and "the culpability of the of-
fender". " 6 The magnitude of Harmelin's offense includes the consider-
ation of the ever increasing threat of illegal drugs in America. 7 There
is no dispute that drugs pose serious societal problems.17 8 In fact, Presi-
dent George Bush considers the "war" on drugs America's top
priority.' 79
Mere possession of drugs, however, even in such a large quantity
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. ACLU Brief for Petitioner, supra note 43, at 16.
172. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2714 (White, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2719.
175. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
176. Id. at 292-93.
177. Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 5.
178. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2716 (White, J., dissenting).
179. Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 19-20. The federal government will
spend over $10.6 billion this year in an effort to rid our society of the scourge of illegal
drugs. Id.
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as possessed by Harmelin, should not automatically warrant life impris-
onment without parole. 18 0 Like crimes of violence, such as murder, rape
and kidnapping, Harmelin's penalty for a drug offense should be tem-
pered by discretionary and individualized sentencing because factors
such as culpability, past criminal record and other mitigating circum-
stances need to be considered to ensure a fair penalty.1 8'
To pass constitutional muster, a punishment should be tailored to
a defendant's personal responsibility and moral culpability.' 82 Ameri-
can courts consider a defendant's intention, and his moral guilt, to be
crucial "to the degree of his criminal culpability."'' 83 However, in
Harmelin, the sentencing judge was not allowed to consider that
Harmelin had no criminal record; he cooperated with police upon his
arrest; he had not displayed any viciousness, and he did not demon-
strate an inability to reform.' Since Michigan does not have a death
penalty, Harmelin's sentence is the most severe punishment Michigan
can levy for any offense, including first degree murder. 8 Mr. Harme-
lin will now spend the rest of his life, and ultimately die, in a Michigan
prison."' Thus, not to take into account the particular facts of his of-
fense, or his personal history and characteristics, is a gross miscarriage
of justice. 187
Justice Kennedy's argument for the majority that the harsh pen-
alty is appropriate given the subsidiary effects of drug use is without
merit. 88 Even though the collateral effects of cocaine are severe, they
are similar to those that result from the misuse of other legal sub-
stances.18 It would be inconceivable for a state to sentence a person
who possesses large amounts of alcohol to mandatory life imprisonment
without parole, because of the tangentiil effects which might eventu-
ally be traced to the alcohol.' 0 Likewise, it is ridiculous to uphold
Harmelin's sentence because of the collateral effects which might indi-
180. Id.
181. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 16.
182. See Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
183. E.g., Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986), (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975)).
184. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 14.
185. Harmelin, Il1 S. Ct. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2718-19.
188. Id. at 2717.
189. Id. at 4856.
190. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2717.
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rectly ensue from the drugs he possessed.19' "'Unfortunately, grave
evils such as the narcotics traffic can too easily cause threats to our
basic liberties by making attractive the adoption of constitutionally for-
bidden shortcuts that might suppress and blot out more quickly the
unpopular and dangerous conduct.' "'19 Amazingly, this is precisely the
approach adopted by the Court. 193
Addressing the second factor of Solem requires evaluating the
sentences imposed for other crimes in Michigan.194 Only two other
crimes in Michigan carry a mandatory penalty such as the one Harme-
lin received: the manufacture or sale of more than 650 grams of a
Schedule 1 or 2 drug' 95 and, first degree murder. 196 Thus, Michigan
has equated the severity of first degree murder with the possession or
sale of 650 or more grams of cocaine. 97 Of particular interest in the
application of the second Solem factor is Michigan's sentencing scheme
for murder, since it punishes only cold blooded murderers with a
mandatory life sentence in prison without parole.1 98 The particular cir-
cumstances of the homicide narrow the penalty to those who are the
most morally reprehensible.' 99
In Harmelin's case, however, the Michigan statute required the
state to prove only that he knowingly possessed over 650 grams of a
substance containing cocaine.1°° The State is not required to prove that
Harmelin had an intention to kill,2 ' or that a death occurred because
of Harmelin's actions.20 2 By contrast, second degree murder, kidnap-
ping, and hostage-taking by prisoners do not carry such a harsh
mandatory sentence as the one Harmelin received, although they do
191. Id. at 2716.
192. Id. at 2717 (quoting Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 427 (1970)
(Black, J., dissenting)).
193. Id.
194. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983).
195. MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.7401 (West 1980).
196. MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (West 1991).
197. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 16.
198. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 40; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.316 (West 1991).
199. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 40. Only first-degree murderers are
considered so morally depraved as to have forfeited their right to live in society forever.
Id.
200. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7401 (West 1980).
201. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 40.
202. Id. Nor is any proof required that Harmelin even had a reckless disregard
for human life. Id.
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provide for the possibility of a life sentence in the exercise of judicial
discretion.2 0 3
This classification for sentencing purposes of Harmelin's offense as
equivalent to first-degree murder and more serious than second-degree
murder is irrational °.20 The severity of harm associated with a drug
possession offense cannot logically be considered, in all cases, to exceed
intentional homicides.20 5 It is ironic that had Harmelin panicked at the
traffic stop, unpremeditatedly shot and killed the police officer, ridded
himself of the cocaine, and then been arrested, he could have been sub-
ject to a lesser sentence up to life.2 6 Such a difference in penalties
exemplifies the disproportionate punishment since Harmelin "has been
treated in the same manner as, or more severely than, criminals who
have committed far more serious crimes. 207
The third criteria under the Solem proportionality test is a com-
parison of the sentence imposed for commission of the same offense in
other jurisdictions.20 8 No other jurisdiction imposes so harsh a punish-
ment as Michigan for possession of the amount of drugs in the present
case.209 Only Alabama imposes a similar punishment, and then only
when a defendant possesses ten kilograms or more of cocaine.2 10 If
Harmelin had been convicted in Alabama, he would have been subject
to a five year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for the of-
fense of' possession of 500 grams to one kilogram of cocaine. '
In fact, in the United States, only Michigan imposes a mandatory
life sentence without parole for possession of cocaine, regardless of
other relevant mitigating circumstances." 2 Only a few states including
Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, Nevada,
203. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.31, 750.349, 750.349(a) (West 1982).
Michigan law allows a prisoner "under sentence for life or for a term of years" to be
eligible for parole after ten years. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 791.234(4) (West 1982).
204. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 17.
205. Id. at 18.
206. Id. On a sentence calling for any term of years Harmelin would be eligible
for disciplinary credits which means that the minimum sentence could not exceed his
life expectancy. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 800.33(5) (West 1982); Brief of
Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 18-19.
207. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 299 (1983).
208. Id. at 291-92.
209. Harmelin, Ill S. Ct. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting).
210. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231(2)(d) (Supp. 1990).
211. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 42; see ALA. CODE § 13A-12-
231(2)(b) (Supp. 1990).
212. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 25.
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Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas authorize a possible
life sentence for first offenders.218 These states, however, do not pre-
clude the possibility of parole, nor the exercise of discretion by the sen-
tencing judge.214
Even under federal law, if a first offender possessed the same
amount of cocaine as Harmelin, the maximum prison sentence would
be a term of not less than five or more than forty years.21 5 Under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, with all relevant enhancements, a
defendant in a similar situation as Harmelin, would expect to receive a
sentence that "would barely exceed ten years. ' 21 6 Moreover, under
Rule thirty five of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the gov-
ernment reserves the right to move for a reduction of a defendant's
sentence under the mandatory minimum of the Sentencing Guidelines
if the defendant has provided substantial assistance to the govern-
ment.2" The state of Michigan has no similar provision. 218
Based on the foregoing, it is obvious that Michigan's mandatory
life imprisonment without parole for the possession of 650 grams or
more of a substance containing cocaine is out of sync with both federal
law and the laws of other states. 219 Therefore, "[iut appears that
[Harmelin] was treated more severely than he would have been in any
other State. '220 The fact that no other jurisdiction mandates such a
harsh penalty for Harmelin's offense establishes "the degree of national
consensus [that the Supreme] Court has previously thought sufficient to
label a particular punishment cruel and unusual. 22
Application of the Solem criteria to Harmelin's situation reveals
213. Id. at 26.
214. Id.
215. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 46, at 28-29.
Under federal law the only possibility of a mandatory sentence of life without parole is
under Title 21 U.S.C. section 848, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute. A con-
viction under this statute requires a person to be an organizer, supervisor, or manager
of five or more people; commit a continuing series of violations; derive substantial re-
sources from the activities; and the organization must have grossed at least ten million
dollars per year, or distributed at least 150 kilograms of cocaine. Id.
216. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting); see also United States
Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, § 2Dl.1 (1990).
217. FED. R. CRIM P. 35; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 46.
218. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 46.
219. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2718-19 (White, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 2719.
221. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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the Michigan statute is unconstitutional.222 The statutorily imposed
mandatory life sentence without parole for possession of 650 or more
grams of cocaine is disproportionate to the offense and thus, violates
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments.22
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Harmelin profoundly displays
the new boldness of a solidly conservative court which seems deter-
mined to subvert individual rights.22' The Justices' concern over the
threat of drugs in society influenced them to uphold a Michigan law
imposing a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for
possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine.22 5 Consequently, by up-
holding such an excessive sentence the Court has likened drug posses-
sion as the moral equivalent of first-degree murder.226
Although stiff anti-drug laws have emotional appeal, they fre-
quently do not produce the results expected by legislators., Practi-
cally speaking, harsh sentences for drug offenses send some non-violent
drug dealers to prison for longer terms than murderers, rapists and
armed robbers.2 28 Therefore, if the eighth amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment is to retain any vitality, such grossly dis-
proportionate treatment must be outlawed.229
Unfortunately, the majority in Harmelin largely abandoned the
ancient notion that the punishment must fit the crime.2s ° In doing so,
the Court sharply limited the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishments. 21 Thus, the Court incorrectly gave a consti-
tutional stamp of approval to the increasingly popular tactic of impos-
222. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2719 (White, J., dissenting).
223. Id.
224. Savage, Justices Uphold Victims' Rights, 'Cruel' Penalties, THE Los AN-
GELES TIMES, June 28, 1991, § A at 1.
225. Marcus, High Court Upholds Life Sentence in Drug Case; Mandatory
Michigan Penalty Imposed for Possession of 1 Pounds of Cocaine, THE WASHING-
TON POST, June 28, 1991, § A at 16.
226. Taylor, supra note 146, at 25.
227. Id.
228. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 36.
229. Taylor, supra note 146, at 25.
230. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2638.
231. Id. at 2714 (White, J., dissenting).
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ing mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for drug offenses with-
out consideration of mitigating circumstances or judicial discretion. 232
Louise S. McAlpin
232. Marcus, supra note 225, at § A at 16.
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